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Abstract
This paper re-examines the issue of asymmetries in the transmission of
shocks to crude oil prices onto the retail price of gasoline. Relative to the
previous literature, the distinguishing features of the present paper are: i) use
of updated and comparable data to carry out an international comparison of
gasoline markets; ii) two-stage modeling of the transmission of oil price
shocks to gasoline prices (first refinery stage and second distribution stage),
in order to assess possible asymmetries at either one or both stages; iii) use
of asymmetric error correction models to distinguish between asymmetries
that arise from short-run deviations in input prices and from the speed at
which the gasoline price reverts to its long-run level; iv) explicit, possibly
asymmetric, role of the exchange rate, as crude oil is paid for in dollars
whereas gasoline sells for different sums of national currencies; v)
bootstrapping of F tests of asymmetries, in order to overcome the low-
power problem of conventional testing procedures. In contrast to several
previous findings, the results generally point to widespread differences in
both adjustment speeds and short-run responses when input prices rise or
fall.
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21. Introduction
Drivers throughout the world are very sensitive to the money
they pay for the fuel consumed by their car or truck. Because
individual mobility is so essential – or, in economists’ jargon,
because gasoline demand is so inelastic – a reduction in the
price of gasoline makes drivers very happy just as a price rise
makes them very upset. Or: very, very upset in the latter case
while only very happy in the former?
This paper deals with the transmission of positive and negative
changes in the price of oil to the price of gasoline. There is a
sizeable literature looking for empirical evidence in support of
asymmetries in this transmission mechanism: allegedly, gasoline
prices go up faster than they go down whenever there is
turbulence in international crude oil markets. Indeed, in every
recurring period of tension in the price of oil there has been
renewed interest and even heated debate about the level of
gasoline prices, the magnitude of its cost components, including
retailers’ margin, and the taxes that contribute to keep those
prices high and sluggish. The debate invariably centers on the
fact that gas prices do not decrease so rapidly as oil prices do.
Asymmetries in the transmission of changes in the price of oil
are in general possible if gasoline markets are non-competitive.
Indeed, unlike the case of perfect competition, varying degrees
of price rigidity are a feature of oligopolistic and
monopolistically competitive markets. Economic theory offers
a few explanations of such price rigidity, and these often
contemplate the possibility of an asymmetric transmission of
cost changes onto product prices.
However, perhaps because structural models of asymmetric
price effects are not easily translated into empirical models, the
literature on gasoline prices has typically employed reduced-
form dynamic equations relating the price of gasoline to the
price of oil. Findings vary across countries and periods, but on
the whole they do not provide firm evidence that prices rise
faster than they fall. To date, therefore, the empirical evidence
3does not seem to justify the blame that the press, public
opinion, some political groups and environmentalist
movements put on the oil industry particularly in periods of
highly volatile prices.
This paper provides fresh new evidence to bear on the issue of
price asymmetries in gasoline markets: are they real or are they
only imaginary as people tend to pay attention to gasoline prices
only when they are rising rapidly?
In this paper we study potential price asymmetries in the
markets of leaded gasoline of five European countries, namely
Germany, France, U.K., Italy, and Spain. The data are monthly
and in general range from the 1985 to 2000. Relative to the
previous literature, the paper is novel in several respects.
First of all, the paper presents an international comparison
employing the same empirical model and estimation technique
and using a very recent, comparable data set. The fact that no
unanimous conclusions could be drawn by previous individual
country studies may, among other things, depend upon the fact
that no similar data across countries for a uniform time period
were used.
A second consideration concerns the econometric methodology
and the dynamic model used to assess price asymmetries. In
this paper an error correction mechanism (ECM henceforth) is
estimated throughout after applying modern unit root and
cointegration techniques. Relative to partial adjustment, “old-
fashioned” ECM and general dynamic models, we are here able
to distinguish between two types of asymmetries: the first refers
to the fact that adjustment of current price levels to desired
targets may differ depending on the sign of the adjustment, the
second one instead has to do with  asymmetries in transitory
price movements.
A third aspect that distinguishes the present contribution is a
more satisfactory consideration of the organizational structure
of the industry under scrutiny. The majority of previous studies
investigated the relationship between crude oil and retail
gasoline prices as a single stage process. However, the industry
4has a more complex structure, often varying country by
country. We may make a small step forward and roughly
suppose the existence of two stages in the production and
distribution process: the first one concerns the transformation
of crude oil into the refined product, while the second one has
to do with the distribution of gasoline to retailers. The relevant
prices involved in the first stage, therefore, are crude oil price
and ex-refinery price. In addition, since crude oil is paid for in
dollars whereas gasoline sells for different sums of national
currencies, the exchange rate plays a relevant, possibly
asymmetric, role at this stage. The subsequent stage instead
deals with the relationship between ex-refinery and retail
gasoline prices. We think that this strategy provides a more
satisfactory representation of the complex chain linking crude
oil to pump prices. Moreover, we believe that it is of interest to
find out whether price asymmetries originate upstream or
downstream in the transmission process: in view of the
suspicions of collusive behavior that often accompany increases
in retail gasoline prices, the two stage nature of our
investigation is clearly useful.
A final point made in the paper is methodological. A few
applied studies employing the asymmetric ECM model have
recently documented that the commonly used F-tests of
equality among the coefficients accounting for the asymmetries
are biased toward accepting the null of symmetry in small
samples. This fact could explain why the data fail to turn up the
asymmetric price adjustments that many commonly suspect. A
way around this technical difficulty is to bootstrap the
asymmetry tests. We carry out this task in the paper and present
results from both standard and bootstrapped test outcomes.
The results of the estimated parameters generally point to
widespread differences both in adjustment speeds and short-
run elasticities when input prices rise or fall. This appears to
confirm the common perception that price increases are larger
than price reductions. This finding characterizes, albeit to a
different extent, nearly all countries and both stages of the
5transmission chain. Conventional tests, however, fail to reject
the symmetry hypothesis. Yet, drawing from a few
contributions which have addressed this specific aspect in
related contexts, we have reasons to believe that those usual
tests have low power when samples are of limited size. We
therefore bootstrap the F statistics and report rejection
frequencies of our tests. The results strongly confirm the
emergence of widespread price asymmetries in the data we have
examined.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin in the next section
with a cursory review of theoretical explanations of price
rigidity and asymmetric price effects. In section 3 we provide a
brief overview of the literature on gasoline prices. Section 4
describes the data and the econometric methodology adopted
in the paper. The results are presented and discussed in section
5. Concluding remarks close the paper.
2. Price Asymmetries in Gasoline Markets: What
Economic Theory Says
A necessary condition for the presence of asymmetric price
effects is price rigidity, which gives rise to sluggish adjustment
of output prices to shocks in cost conditions. However,
according to Peltzman (2000) “economic theory suggests no
pervasive tendency for prices to respond faster to one kind of
cost change than to another” (p.467). Yet, there are a number
of more or less standard arguments that can be put forth
concerning the issue of asymmetric adjustment.
To begin with, profit maximizing behavior forces firms in
competitive markets to adjust their prices to new cost
conditions immediately, and presumably symmetrically. This
holds when frictions and imperfections are absent from
markets.
Menu costs, however, preclude instantaneous price adjustment
even if firms have no market power. Similarly, accountancy
6rules and inventory valuation may be responsible for the
sluggish adjustment of final prices with respect to increase or
decrease of major exogenous variables. Take, for example,
inventory valuation.
As is well known, there are two generally accepted ways of
valuing products held by a firm, one based on historical costs and
the second based on replacement costs. When a historical
criterion (FIFO) is adopted to value inventories, the firm does not
adjust its output price immediately when costs change, but awaits
until the stocks of inputs bought at the old price are depleted.
When instead a replacement cost criterion (LIFO) is applied, the
firm adjusts its price very rapidly in response to changes in input
costs. The accounting convention chosen by a firm can therefore
have an influence on the speed of adjustment: application of a
FIFO criterion results in longer lags than in the case of a LIFO
principle.
Market power is probably the greatest concern to those who
observe that gasoline prices respond more quickly to oil price
increases than when they fall. The standard argument goes as
follows. Retailers allegedly try to maintain their “normal” profit
margins when prices rise, but they try to capture the larger
margins that result, at least temporarily, when upstream prices fall.
In both cases the situation is not to last because, for instance,
consumer search costs are present. When costly search is
completed, profits go down and prices tend to competitive levels.
A version of this story that emphasizes tacit collusion in
oligopolistic markets notes that, when upstream prices rise, each
firm is quick to increase its selling price in order to signal its
competitors that it is adhering to the tacit agreement; when
upstream prices fall, it is slow in adjusting its price because it does
not want to run the risk of selling a signal that it is cutting its
margins and breaking away from the agreement.
Finally, another argument is the fact that adjusting production is
costly. When a cost shock occurs profit maximizing competitive
firms absorb part of the shock by depleting inventories when
input prices fall and storing output when they rise. This leads
7prices not to immediately adjust to cost shocks even in
competitive markets, although it is perfectly consistent with firms
enjoying market power. According to Borenstein, Cameron, and
Gilbert (1997), asymmetry is consistent with the above story if the
net marginal convenience yield (the change in net distribution
costs resulting from a change in inventory levels) is convex. In
this case cost increases will be accomodated more quickly.
Coming back to Peltzman (2000)’s examination of “literally
hundreds of markets” (p.469), the author finds that neither
inventory holdings nor menu costs seem a key ingredient in
producing price asymmetries. The hypothesis of asymmetric
costs of input adjustment appears to be more consistent with
price asymmetry. More generally, price asymmetry is as
characteristic of competitive as oligopoly market structures.
3. Price Asymmetries in Gasoline Markets: What the
Applied Literature Says
Numerous attempts have been made to analyze the relationship
between the price of the input (crude oil in the present case)
and the price of the corresponding output (here petroleum
products). The product which has been most studied is gasoline
because its share of petroleum consumption is large and
because the wide geographical dispersion of sales (relative to
the total volume sold) gives rise to a diversity of market
situations within a single country.1
About a dozen studies have specifically dealt with the issue of
the asymmetric transmission of price changes in gasoline
markets. These studies generally differ in one or more of the
following aspects: the country under scrutiny; the time
                                                          
1 Unlike previous studies, which have documented price asymmetries in
selected markets (including gasoline, bank deposits, agricultural products),
Peltzman (2000) uses large samples of diverse products: 77 consumer and
165 producer goods.
8frequency and period of the data used; the focus on wholesale
and retail gas prices or on oil and gasoline prices; the dynamic
model employed in the empirical investigation.
The problem of a different response to price increases and
decreases is first considered in Bacon (1991)’s work on the
U.K. gasoline market, which is however limited to the second
stage of the transmission chain (the ex-Rotterdam spot price is
used as a proxy of the product price).2 Biweekly data are used
for the period 1982-1989. The author finds that increases in the
product price are fully transmitted within two months, in the
case of price reductions an extra week is necessary. Moreover,
changes in the exchange rate necessitate two extra weeks
relative to product prices before being incorporated in retail gas
prices.
Manning (1991) looks directly at the impact of changes in oil
prices on U.K. retail prices. The data are monthly for 1973-
1988 and an ECM specification allowing for asymmetry only in
the dynamic part of the equation is used. Weak and non-
persistent asymmetry in price changes, which is absorbed within
four months, is found. No formal tests of asymmetric price
effects are however performed.
Shifting attention to the U.S., Karrenbrock (1991) employs
1983-1990 monthly data to study the empirical relationship
between wholesale and (after tax) retail gasoline prices. The
author uses a distributed lags model to find that the length of
time in which a wholesale price increase is fully reflected in the
                                                          
2 Although not directly testing for asymmetric price changes, Bacon (1986) is
probably the first study to structure the analysis of pricing in gasoline
markets into two stages: first the relationship between crude oil price and
factory gate product prices, and then the relationship between product
prices and net of tax retail prices. The data refer to the United Kingdom
and are monthly covering the 1977-1985 period. The fitted equation is
specified as an autoregressive-distributed lag. The author finds that crude
oil price changes are passed on to refinery prices quickly, within the
current month; this is not so for changes in product to retail prices, whose
adjustment is much slower, although the speed of reaction does not
appear to differ between product price and exchange rate changes.
9retail gasoline price is the same as that of a wholesale price
decrease for premium and unleaded regular gasoline. Instead,
wholesale price increases for leaded regular gasoline are passed
along to consumer more quickly than price decreases.
Nevertheless, the author concludes, contrary to the popular
belief that consumers do not benefit from wholesale gasoline
price decreases, these are eventually passed along to consumers
as fully as are wholesale gasoline price increases.
Lanza (1991) chooses the Federal Republic of Germany as the
country to study. The period is 1980-1990, thus including the
oil price collapse of 1986. The analysis is structured in two
stages, employs monthly data and is based on an asymmetric
partial adjustment model: the dependent price variable
(wholesale or retail gasoline price) responds to its lagged value
differently depending upon positive or negative changes in the
price explanatory variable (crude oil or wholesale price
respectively). The author’s findings are: (i) at the refinery level
there is only weak evidence of asymmetric reaction (the average
lag is about three months); (ii) at the consumers’ level the speed
of adjustment is lower in the case of price reductions than for
price rises.
Kirchgässner and Kübler (1992) also look at West Germany for
the period 1972-1989 using monthly data. The authors consider
the response of both consumer and producer leaded gasoline
prices to the spot price on the Rotterdam market; they
distinguish two periods, before and after January 1980. The
methodology adopted is very rigorous: the time series are tested
for, respectively, unit roots, Granger causality, cointegration,
and structural breaks. When cointegration cannot be rejected,
both symmetric and asymmetric ECMs are fitted.
Unfortunately, the asymmetry is permitted only for price
changes, thus allowing only for a different response in the
short-run but not in  adjustment speeds. Briefly stated, the
results show that, while long-run reactions are not significantly
different for the 1970s and the 1980s, there is considerable
asymmetry in the former period but not in the latter in the
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short-run adjustment processes. In particular, reductions in the
Rotterdam prices are transferred faster to German markets than
increases.
Shin (1994) relates the average wholesale price of oil products
to the price of oil in his investigation of the U.S. market. He
uses monthly data for the period 1986-1992; his dynamic model
quite simply regresses average wholesale price changes on
positive and negative oil price changes and shows no evidence
of short-run asymmetric effects.
The focus of Duffy-Deno (1996) is again on the U.S., and in
particular on the downstream relationship between wholesale
and net-of-tax-retail gasoline prices. The data this time are
weekly for 1989-1993 and the econometric model, a general
unrestricted distributed lag specification,  shows strong short-
run and long-run asymmetries, with a fuller, longer (4 weeks)
adjustment in the case of price rises and an incomplete, shorter
(2 weeks) adjustment for price falls.
Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert (1997) study the U.S.
gasoline market using weekly data for 1986-1992. The empirical
investigation confirms the common belief that retail gasoline
prices react more quickly to increases in crude oil prices than do
decreases (4 weeks versus 8 weeks). An ECM is estimated but,
like the previous paper, only asymmetry for price changes is
permitted.
Balke, Brown, and Yücel (1998) extend the work of Borenstein
et al. (1997) by using two different model specifications with
weekly data from 1987 through 1997. In particular the authors
use a distributed lags model in the levels of prices with
asymmetric effects and an ECM representation which allows
for both long-run and short-run asymmetries.3 On the basis of
                                                          
3 Both in Borenstein et al. (1997) and in Balke et al. (1998) the restriction
represented by the long-run level relationship is not imposed (no
cointegration analysis is performed) in the ECM. This implies that the
long-run asymmetry introduced in the second paper applies to the
different parameters of the price level variables and not to the error
correction coefficient.
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an encompassing test this last specification is preferred. Both
models involve three prices, with the wholesale price depending
upon oil and spot prices and the retail price upon wholesale and
spot prices. The authors do not obtain unambiguous evidence
concerning asymmetry, being weak in the specification in levels
and moderate and persistent in the ECM.
Reilly and Witt (1998) go back to the U.K. market to revisit the
evidence of Bacon (1991) and Manning (1991) with monthly
data for 1982-1995 and emphasizing the role of the dollar-
pound exchange rate and the potential asymmetries associated
with it, in addition to those of crude oil prices. A restricted
ECM is estimated which allows only for short-run asymmetry.
The hypothesis of a symmetric response by petrol retailers to
crude price rises and falls is rejected by the data, and so is for
changes in the exchange rate.
Finally, three recent papers look at the experience of other
countries. Godby, Lintner, Stengos, and Wandschneider (2000)
study the Canadian market for both premium and regular
gasoline. The analysis is based on weekly data for thirteen cities
between 1990 and 1996. By noting that the asymmetric ECM
specifications used in previous studies are misspecified if price
asymmetries are triggered by a minimum absolute increase in
crude cost, a Threshold AutoRegressive model within an ECM
is implemented in the paper. On this basis the authors fail to
find evidence of asymmetric pricing behavior.
Asplund, Eriksson, and Friberg (2000) investigate the Swedish
retail market by fitting a restricted ECM with asymmetries only
on the short-run dynamic components. The data are monthly
and cover the period 1980 through 1996. There is some
evidence that in the short-run prices are stickier downwards
than upwards. Also, prices respond more rapidly to exchange
rate movements than to the spot market prices.
Berardi, Franzosi, and Vignocchi (2000) study the Italian lower
end of the market considering the retail price of both leaded
and unleaded gasoline as a function of Platt’s Med ex-refinery
price. The data are weekly 1991-2000 and are used in the
12
estimation of an ECM specification which allows for
asymmetries both in the long-run and short-run components.
The authors conduct formal tests of equality between
coefficients associated with these asymmetries and find that the
hypothesis of a differential response in the long-run is rejected,
while the evidence is less clear-cut for the short-run (symmetry
is rejected at 5% for unleaded but not for leaded gasoline; at 1%
symmetry is always rejected).
Summarizing, most previous articles have studied markets of
individual countries, most often the U.S. and U.K. The period
usually investigated covers the 80s and 90s, although Manning
(1991) looks back at the period after 1973 and Berardi et al.
(2000) arrive at year 2000. The frequency of the data is typically
either weekly or monthly, although sometimes biweekly data are
also employed. In general the contributions surveyed consider
the lower end of the market, the one in which the product is
distributed and sold to the pump. The relevant prices involved
are therefore some wholesale price and the retail price. The
other prevailing type of analysis is the one that in a single stage
relates the price of crude oil to the pump price. Lanza (1991)
appears to be the only study to analyze asymmetries in both
stages of the transmission chain of cost shocks to the final
gasoline prices. Finally, only a few recent papers make use of
the latest developments in time series econometrics: by
rigorously testing for unit roots and finding evidence of long-
run cointegrating relationships between the relevant prices, it is
possible to model, estimate and test for asymmetric price
effects both in the short-run and long-run.
4. Data and Econometric Methodology
We represent the complex chain of transformation of crude oil
into the refined gasoline product as a two-stage process: first we
consider the transformation of oil into the refined product, and
then its distribution to gas stations. Of each stage we investigate
13
the potential asymmetries in the transmission of input price
changes onto output prices. For the sake of comparison with
the bulk of the literature and in order to appreciate the
advantages of a two-stage representation, we also consider the
transmission of changes in crude oil prices directly on the price
of gasoline.
We conduct an international comparison of the issue at hand
among five European  countries, namely Germany, France,
U.K., Italy, and Spain. The sample period ranges from January
1985 to June 2000 (the German sample stops at February 1997)
and leaded gasoline has been considered.4
The variables used in this paper are the price of crude oil (C),
the gasoline spot price (S), the before-tax gasoline retail price
(R), and the exchange rate between U.S. dollar and individual
national currencies (ER). We denote the natural logarithm of
these variables by lowercase letters. In particular, crude oil price
is the Crude Oil Import Costs in U.S. dollars/bbl (average unit
value, c.i.f.) published by the International Energy Agency. As a
proxy for the ex-refinery gasoline price we use the gasoline spot
price f.o.b. Rotterdam for the European countries.5 The
gasoline retail prices are also from the International Energy
Agency. Since any company purchasing in the spot market must
pay in dollars, the exchange rate between the national currency
and U.S. dollar is used. These series are taken from the
International Monetary Fund. As already emphasized by Bacon
(1991), it is clear that the exchange rate may be a relevant
                                                          
4 We have chosen this sample for at least two reasons. In terms of product
and geographical coverage, we want to have an idea of possible price
asymmetries, taking into account that leaded gasoline has been very
important over the sample period in the European countries. In terms of
time period, we start from right before the 1986 oil price collapse until the
most recent months. Finally, the reason why the German sample stops at
a different date is due to the unavailability of the relevant information
from the official source of our data.
5 More information on gasoline spot prices can be found in “General Note
on Definition Methods and Source” published in the quarterly statistics
Energy Price and Taxes of the International Energy Agency, Paris.
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source of asymmetry in non-U.S. countries. Hence the
importance of allowing separately for positive and negative
changes in exchange rates.
Summarizing, the basic relationships we take to the data are the
following:
tttt eracaas e+++= 210        (1)
ttt saar e++= 10        (2)
tttt eracaar e+++= 210        (3)
Equations (1)-(3) represent the long-run or equilibrium
relationships relating output prices to input prices and exchange
rates. Equation (1) refers to the first stage in which the price of
crude oil, along with the exchange rate, determines the spot
gasoline price; according to (2) this price affects the retail price
of gasoline. It is apparent that the exchange rate enters only the
first stage of the chain as both retail and spot prices are
denominated and posted in the same national currency.6 Finally,
(3) relates in a single stage the retail price of petrol to that of
crude oil.
The asymmetry in the transmission of changes in input prices
to output prices can be accomodated within a dynamic model.
However, it is important to distinguish between two types of
asymmetries. This distinction can be best entertained by a
dynamic ECM specification estimated in two steps. That is, let
teˆ  denote the residual of (1) through (3) and define
                                                          
6 Note that in principle the coefficient in front of the exchange rate should
be the same as that of crude oil price. We do not impose such restriction.
In addition, the influence of sources of costs other than the relevant prices
(and exchange rate) are considered to be negligible and relegated into the
disturbance term. Finally, in order not to clutter notation we have
maintained the same symbols for coefficients and disturbance term of
different equations.
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account for asymmetry in the adjustment to equilibrium,
whereas short-run asymmetry is captured by similarly
decomposing price (and exchange rate) changes into
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Thus asymmetry of the first type is related to the speed at
which a gap between the current and the equilibrium level (as
described by the long-run relationships (1)-(3)) of spot or retail
prices is filled within the period. This speed can differ
according to whether the current price is below or above its
equilibrium level. The asymmetric ECMs can therefore be
formulated as follows:
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where D is the first difference operator. Recent advances in
time series econometrics suggest that the first step toward
estimation of (4)-(6) is to check whether or not the different
price series and exchange rates are stationary. Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for unit roots have been used  and all
variables have been found to be integrated of order one, or I(1),
                                                          
7 The two ECM series take on only positive (resp. negative) values and zero
otherwise.
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most of them with  intercept and trend.8 Though non-stationary,
these series may form a linear combination which is stationary,
or I(0). In this case there are long-run or equilibrium
relationships between relevant price series as represented in (1)-
(3). The relevant series are said to be cointegrated and this
implies that the residual of the equations teˆ  is I(0). Again ADF
tests are used to test for cointegration. OLS estimation of (1)-
(3) yields (super) consistent estimates of long-run responses of
output prices to changes in input prices and exchange rates.
Finally, when two or more variables are cointegrated, we know
from the Engle-Granger representation theorem that they
admit an ECM formulation of the type (4)-(6).
All the above considerations apply to the case of symmetric
effects, but the ECM has been extended to the case of
asymmetric adjustment originally by Granger and Lee (1989). In
this case first differences and cointegration residual can be
decomposed into positive and negative changes as shown
above. We merely note here that in order to allow for
asymmetric adjustment to long-run equilibrium it is necessary
to estimate the asymmetric ECM in two steps.9
5. Empirical Results
                                                          
8 Results from tests and estimation of (1) through (6) are not reported here
to economize on space. We just concentrate on results and tests
concerning price asymmetries. The complete set of results is contained in
an appendix available from the authors.
9 One could observe that estimation of equations (4)-(6) is affected by a a
generated regressor problem, as the ECM terms are obtained from the
prior estimation of (1)-(3). While this is certainly reason for concern in the
usual context, McAleer, McKenzie and Pesaran (1994), among others,
note that generated regressors cease to be a problem when variables are
non-stationary and cointegrated.
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Tables 1 and 2 present the results from estimation of
asymmetric price effects, whereas Tables 3 and 4 present the
evidence of testing for price asymmetries.
5.1 Evidence on Asymmetric Adjustment Speeds and Short-run Price
Asymmetries
Table 1 reports the magnitude and statistical significance of the
adjustment speed coefficients )(+b  and )(-b , which allow us to
evaluate long-run or persistent asymmetry, and magnitude and
significance of the coefficients of price changes )(+g  and )(-g ,
which instead account for short-run or transitory asymmetry.
The results suggest several remarks.
Firstly, the table shows that, with just five exceptions, all
coefficients are statistically significant, in the vast majority of
cases at the 1% confidence level. According to Granger and Lee
(1989), the significance of individual coefficients is a necessary
condition for testing for asymmetric effects.
Secondly, the comparison between “positive” and “negative”
coefficients shows that the former in general exceed, in
absolute value, the latter. This holds for each stage of the
production and distribution chain and both for long-run and
short-run. However, to establish significant divergences
between the two groups of parameters requires rigorous
statistical testing, an aspect we tackle below.
Thirdly, if we consider the two-stage approach we have adopted
to describe the transmission chain of price shocks to final
gasoline prices relative to the single-stage practice, we see that
numerical estimates are very different. In particular, first-stage
adjustment speeds are generally smaller in absolute value than
second-stage speeds, whereas the contrary appears to be true
for short-run price elasticities. These differences do not surface
in the single-stage approach.
If we restrict our attention to point estimates, the picture that
emerges appears to confirm the general perception of a more
rapid adjustment in the case of price rises relative to price falls.
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This can be seen, as far as the short-run is concerned, by direct
comparison of the estimated parameters in that they represent
contemporaneous price adjustments: in the majority of cases
the coefficient g associated with price increases is larger than
that corresponding to price reductions. There are exceptions
though, but the differences among coefficients do not appear to
be large. It is clear that in these cases a test of equality between
coefficients is called for. As for the long-run, note that the
positive and negative b coefficients are respectively associated
with adjustment to the long-run equilibrium level of price from
above and from below. Also these parameters differ in general.
It is however perhaps useful and more informative to use an
alternative statistics based on those adjustment speed
coefficients.
5.2 Evidence on Asymmetric Adjustment
Table 2 presents evidence on this type of asymmetry by
computing the number of weeks necessary to close the gap
between current and desired (long-run or equilibrium)  levels of
price. In particular, we compute the following statistics:
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where the numerator is the log of the percentage gap closed
and b is the speed of adjustment coefficient estimated, for
either upward and downward adjustments, in the ECM
equations (4)-(6). Formula (7) can be used to compute the
number of weeks necessary to close x% of the gap between
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actual and long-run price levels.10 Because monthly data are
used in estimation, (7) becomes:
b
)1ln(
7
30 x
t
-
=        (8)
Letting x=50%, 95%  Table 2 tells us how many weeks it takes
for the price of gasoline to revert to its equilibrium level once a
shock has caused him to diverge upward or downward. The
results show that it often takes less time to go back up to the
equilibrium level when the price is forced downward: as an
example 9 weeks are necessary to re-establish the long-run level
in the case of a negative shock to the German leaded retail
gasoline against 12.6 in the case of a positive shock. This is not
however always the case, as again the example of Germany for
the first-stage documents (22.2 versus 15 weeks). At any rate,
when we translate differences in adjustment speeds into time
periods there do not appear to exist sizeable differences
between upward and downward deviations from equilibrium.
Finally, adjustment is faster in the second-stage of the chain
than in the first-stage.
5.3 Evidence on Exchange Rate Asymmetries
The next table considers the issue of the asymmetric
transmission of shocks in exchange rates to retail gasoline
prices. Table 3 deserves a few comments. First, dollar exchange
rate effects are statistically significant in all cases. Interestingly,
this significance often disappears in the single-stage case. This
evidence lends support to the idea of breaking up into two
stage the production and distribution chain of gasoline on the
one hand, and of allowing for exchange rate asymmetries on the
other. Finally, we see that gasoline prices are more responsive
                                                          
10 This statistics has been suggested  and used in other contexts by
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1987) and Eichenbaum (1989). A full
derivation of (7) is contained in an appendix available from the authors.
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to increases in the exchange rate than decreases, and this fact
again emerges clearly in the first-stage results.
5.4. Evidence on Tests of Price Asymmetries
We have remarked above that in order to establish significant
divergences between “positive” and “negative” estimated
coefficients formal statistical testing is required.
The general formulation of the asymmetric ECM, originally
introduced by Granger and Lee (1989), has been often used as
the appropriate statistical framework for conventional F tests of
the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment, both in terms of
adjustment speeds  towards a cointegrating equilibrium and of
short-run responses.
In terms of equations (4)-(6) a rejection of the null hypothesis
)()(
0 :
-+ = bbLH  implies asymmetric adjustment to a long-run
equilibrium, whereas short-run asymmetries arise when the null
hypothesis )()(0 :
-+ = ggSH is rejected. Table 4 reports the
calculated conventional F tests of LH0  and 
SH0 . It immediately
appears that the symmetry hypothesis is rejected only in 5 cases
out of 30 and, of  these 5 cases, only 1 is a rejection at 1%
significance level (3 cases at 5 % and 1 at 10%). In addition,
short-run symmetry is rejected in 2 cases out of 5, while
symmetric adjustment to the long-run is rejected in 3 cases,
including the one at 10% significance level. The countries
which do not experience any asymmetry are Italy, U.K. and
Germany. France and Spain show both types of asymmetries (at
single and second stage, respectively).
The overall picture which emerges from testing the symmetry
hypothesis therefore runs contrary to both the common
perception and to the visual inspection of the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients made in the previous tables.
A few recent papers have questioned the reliability of
conventional tests of symmetry in the above and similar
contexts. In particular, these contributions note that there is a
tendency to over-reject the null hypothesis of symmetry which
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can be traced to the low power of standard F statistics. Cook,
Holly, and Turner (1998) note that, for the asymmetric
adjustment ECM to be valid, )(+b  and )(-b  must be both
significantly different from each other and individually
significant (similar considerations apply to the other coefficients
of asymmetry). Using the Granger and Lee (1989) data, Cook
(1999) estimates an asymmetric ECM and finds that the
corresponding null hypotheses are rejected by conventional F
and t tests at 5% significance level in only 8% of all the
estimated models. Cook, Holly, and Turner (1999) show that
the variance of the difference between the estimated )(+b  and
)(-b  tends to zero as the sample size increases. However, for a
given sample size, this variance is increasing in )()( ˆˆ -+ - bb
and in the ratio of the variance of the independent variable to
that of the dependent variable in the ECM. Monte Carlo
simulation experiments confirm that some improvements in the
power of the F statistics are made when the difference between
the adjustment speed parameters doubles, while rejection
frequencies rise substantially only for large samples (500
observations or more). Overall, rejection frequencies remain
low, in the order of 17%, for economically plausible sample
sizes and magnitudes of )()( ˆˆ -+ - bb .11
The findings just mentioned suggest that any straightforward
interpretation of the results of Table 4 could be misleading. In
order to overcome the documented unreliability of standard
tests of symmetry we have bootstrapped the F statistics for
both LH0  and 
SH0  and have calculated the corresponding
rejection frequencies at the 5% significance level on the basis of
1,000 replications. The results are presented in Table 5.
Rejection frequencies greater than 15% are found in 17 cases
                                                          
11 See Cook et al. (1999), first row of Table 1, figure in column Rej , sample
size T=100.
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out of 30, whereas 3 are the cases with high (i.e. greater than
58%) rejection frequencies.12 If we reinterpret the results of
Table 4 in the light of these findings, the picture changes
dramatically. In particular, each country is now more likely to
be characterized by both long-run and short-run asymmetries.
Moreover, in Italy, Spain and U.K. asymmetries arise in the
second stage, whereas in France and Germany they appear
mainly at first and single stage.
Generally speaking, we find that in (almost) all countries
asymmetries arise in the second stage. The straightforward
interpretation of this result lies in the more competitive
environment of the refining sector with respect to the
distribution sector where several different operators could act
to increase upward rigidity.
6. Conclusions
In a recent paper, Peltzman (2000) states that “economic theory
suggests no pervasive tendency for prices to respond faster to
one kind of cost change than to another” (p.467). However,
after an examination of “literally hundreds of markets” (p.469),
he concludes that “the person in the street is right and we
This paper has re-examined the issue of presumed asymmetries
in the transmission of shocks to crude oil prices onto the retail
price of gasoline. Especially in periods of volatile international
markets, this is an issue to which both public opinion (nearly all
are driving cars and trucks) and policy makers are quite
sensitive. It has therefore attracted the interest of energy
economists, who have carried out several empirical
investigations on gasoline markets with a special eye to the
hypothesis that prices rise faster than they fall.
                                                          
12 See Cook et al. (1999), first row of Table 1, figure in column Rej , sample
size T=500.
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Relative to the previous literature the present paper contains
several elements of novelty. Firstly, it uses updated and
comparable data to carry out an international comparison of
gasoline markets, unlike previous work which has invariably
concentrated on individual national markets. Secondly, it breaks
up the process of transmission of oil price shocks to gasoline
prices into two stages, roughly corresponding to a first refinery
stage and then to a second distribution stage. In so doing we
are able to assess possible asymmetries at either one or both
stages. This is obviously relevant from a market structure
perspective. Thirdly, by a suitable choice of the dynamic
regression model with which to analyze the problem, we are
able to distinguish between asymmetries arising from short-
lived deviations in input prices and asymmetries characterizing
the speed at which the gasoline price, once shocked, reverts to
its long-run or equilibrium level. The so-called asymmetric
ECM allows precisely to carry out this task. Fourthly, we allow
for an explicit possibly asymmetric role of the exchange rate, as
crude oil price is paid for in dollars whereas gasoline sells for
different sums of national currencies.
The results of the estimated parameters generally point to
widespread differences both in adjustment speeds and short-
run elasticities when input prices rise or fall. This appears to
confirm the common perception amply echoed by newspapers
in periods of increasing international oil prices of more rapid
price increases relative to price reductions. This finding
characterizes, albeit to a different extent, nearly all countries
and both stages of the transmission chain. When however we
turn to conventional testing, we find that the usual F tests
overwhelmingly fail to reject the symmetry hypothesis. Yet,
drawing from a few contributions which have addressed this
specific aspect in related contexts, we have reasons to believe
that those usual tests have low power when samples are of
limited size. We therefore bootstrap the F statistics and report
rejection frequencies of our tests. The results strongly confirm
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the emergence of widespread price asymmetries in the data we
have examined.
In summary, and in contrast to several previous findings, we do
find that rockets and feathers appear to dominate the price
adjustment mechanism of gasoline markets in many European
countries.
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TABLE 1: Asymmetric Adjustment Speeds and Short-run Price Asymmetries
Italy France Spain Germany U.K.
First Stage: spot = f(crude, exchange rate)
Asym. adj. speed
)(+b -0.640* -0.733** -0.347* -0.855** -0.470**
Asym. adj. speed
)(-b -0.400 -0.498* -0.345* -0.579** -0.272
Short-run asymmetry
)(+g 0.877** 0.801** 0.839** 0.867** 0.766**
Short-run asymmetry
)(-g 0.856** 0.923** 0.581** 1.156** 0.718**
Second Stage: retail = g(spot)
Asym. adj. speed
)(+b -0.732** -0.929** -0.937** -1.022** -0.885**
Asym. adj. speed
)(-b -0.977** -0.892** -0.772** -1.422** -0.894**
Short-run asymmetry
)(+g 0.180** 0.362** 0.216** 0.478** 0.306**
Short-run asymmetry
)(-g 0.205** 0.281** 0.229** 0.474** 0.194**
Single Stage: retail = h(crude, exchange rate)
Asym. adj. speed
)(+b -1.367** -1.055** -1.075** -0.739** -0.153
Asym. adj. speed
)(-b -1.359** -0.678** -1.011** -1.127** -0.117*
Short-run asymmetry
)(+g 0.196** 0.562** 0.236** 0.788** 0.435**
Short-run asymmetry
)(-g 0.240** 0.164 0.160** 0.552** 0.237**
Notes to the table: a single (double) asterisk denotes significance at 5% (1%) level.
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TABLE 2: Long -run Price Asymmetries
Italy France Spain Germany     U.K.
First Stage: spot = f(crude, exchange rate)
50% of gap (upward deviation) 4.6 4.0 8.6 3.5      6.3
50% of gap (downward deviation) 7.4 6.0 8.6 5.1     10.9
95% of gap (upward deviation) 20.1 17.5 37.0 15.0     27.3
95% of gap (downward deviation) 32.1 25.8 37.2 22.2     47.2
Second Stage: retail = g(spot)
50% of gap (upward deviation) 4.0 3.2 3.2 2.9     3.3
50% of gap (downward deviation) 3.0 3.3 3.8 2.1     3.3
95% of gap (upward deviation) 17.5 13.8 13.7 12.6    14.5
95% of gap (downward deviation) 13.1 14.4 16.6 9.0    14.4
Single Stage: retail = h(crude, exchange rate)
50% of gap (upward deviation) 2.2 2.8 2.8 4.0    19.4
50% of gap (downward deviation) 2.2 4.4 2.9 2.6    25.4
95% of gap (upward deviation) 9.4 12.2 11.9 17.4    83.9
95% of gap (downward deviation) 9.4 18.9 12.7 11.4   109.7
Notes to the table: the figures represent the number of weeks needed to fill 50% and 95% of the gap
between current and equilibrium price levels, distinguishing between price increases and decreases.
The figures are computed using the error correction coefficients estimated in the asymmetric
ECM.
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TABLE 3: Exchange Rate Asymmetries
Italy France Spain Germany U.K.
First Stage: spot = f(crude, exchange rate)
Short-run asymmetry
)(+d 1.055** 1.477** 1.297** 1.494** 1.503**
Short-run asymmetry
)(-d 0.828** 0.698* 0.825* 0.771** 0.481
Single Stage: retail = h(crude, exchange rate)
Short-run asymmetry
)(+d -0.062 0.324 0.156 0.246 0.732**
Short-run asymmetry
)(-d 0.464** 0.693** 0.143 0.405 0.071
Notes to the table: a single (double) asterisk denotes significance at 5% (1%) level.
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TABLE 4: Computed F Tests of Asymmetric Adjustment Speeds and
 Short-run Price Effects
Italy France Spain Germany U.K.
Null Hypothesis
First Stage: spot = f(crude, exchange rate)
Sym. adj. speeds 1.855 1.651 0.0001 2.058 1.076
Short-run symmetry 0.019 0.481 2.240 2.093 0.075
Second Stage: retail = g(spot)
Sym. adj. speeds 2.193 0.197 4.465** 0.014 1.169
Short-run symmetry 1.707 0.017 5.900** 2.404 1.083
Single Stage: retail = h(crude, exchange rate)
Sym. adj. speeds 0.004 3.999** 0.128 2.926* 0.091
Short-run symmetry 0.439 9.289*** 0.618 1.613 2.348
Notes to the table: (i) entries are calculated F tests of the equality between estimated
coefficients associated with error correction terms (sym. adj. speeds) and price changes
(short-run symmetry); (ii) a single (double) [triple] asterisk denotes significance at 10%
(5%) [1%] level.
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TABLE 5: Simulated F Tests of Asymmetric Adjustment Speeds and
 Short-run Price Effects
Italy France Spain Germany U.K.
Null Hypothesis
First Stage: spot = f(crude, exchange rate)
Sym. adj. speeds 0.387 0.335 0.047 0.374 0.265
Short-run symmetry 0.045 0.117 0.369 0.334 0.053
Second Stage: retail = g(spot)
Sym. adj. speeds 0.244 0.069 0.425 0.063 0.177
Short-run symmetry 0.219 0.071 0.598 0.135 0.178
Single Stage: retail = h(crude, exchange rate)
Sym. adj. speeds 0.058 0.637 0.06 0.438 0.050
Short-run symmetry 0.082 0.882 0.129 0.292 0.346
Notes to the table: entries are simulated rejection frequencies, i.e. the percentage number of
times (out of 1,000 replications) the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment speeds
(resp. short-run symmetry) is rejected by an F tests at 5% level.
